# 黎安友：中国中产阶级谜题（2015）

我的精神家園S  2018-05-16

作者 黎安友

2017年01月16日（中文版刊登日期）

中国中产阶级谜题

黎安友 著

陈万龙 译

本文为哥伦比亚大学教授黎安友（Andrew J. Nathan）2015年10月在“塞缪尔∙李普塞特世界民主讲座”（Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on Democracy in the World）上演讲的讲稿。李普塞特是现代化理论的主要奠基人。他从社会经济结构的角度探讨民主的发生与存在条件。黎安友教授演讲的英文版发表于《民主杂志》(Journal of Democracy) 2016年4月号，总第27期。中译文首发于《中国战略分析》2017年第1期，2017年1月15日。


> 我个人从没有跟西摩·马丁·李普塞特（Seymour Martin Lipset）见过面；我到哥伦比亚大学的时候他已经离开了。李普塞特写过一篇自传体文章——《稳定的工作：一篇学术回忆录》，里面回顾了他在1943年成为哥伦比亚大学博士的经过。我看到觉得非常有趣。他说他当时在纽约市立学院（CityCollege）的社会学系拿到了一个教职，而那个教职要求受聘者必须得是在册研究生。因为哥伦比亚大学离那只有1英里远，下个坡再上个坡就到了，所以他就去了哥伦比亚大学。[1]我心想，今天要是选择一个研究生项目也像那么简单就好了。


作为一个哥伦比亚大学的博士生和年轻讲师，李普塞特当时是跟罗伯特·莫顿（RobertMerton）和保罗·拉扎斯菲尔德（Paul Lazarsfeld）这样奠定了现代政治社会学基础的学术巨匠一起工作的。等到我在20世纪60年代中期进入研究生院的时候，李普塞特的著作已经成为我们博士资格考试的必读书了。现在，我作为一个资深的学者，会抱怨学生们不去读本学科的经典著作。但李普塞特在1960年出版的《政治人》是个例外，大家都会去读。特别有影响的是他在1959年发表的文章《民主的一些必要条件：经济发展与政治合法性》（“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development andPolitical Legitimacy”），收在这本书中作为一章，题为《经济发展与民主》（“EconomicDevelopment and Democracy”）。这篇文章讨论了他的一个经典命题：“一个国家的经济越发达，它就越可能维持（sustain）民主制度”。[2]李普塞特（讲明是在亚里士多德、马基雅维利和韦伯的影响下）提出：经济发展会扩大中产阶级，而中产阶级会支持民主。

关于如何准确地理解这一理论，已经有了很多争论，[3]但在此领域内并未达成共识。针对这个问题，我坚持认为：第一，中产阶级会更倾向于选择民主。如果民主已经存在，他们会支持民主；如果民主尚不存在，他们会希望得到它（虽然并不一定会采取行动）。这种支持民主的倾向，既基于物质利益的考虑（比如中产阶级希望有法治来保障他们的财产所有权），也出于文化价值的原因（比如独立的经济地位和受教育机会会带来独立个体的自尊和对思想、言论自由的偏好）。然而，第二，中产阶级的存在不一定能够导致走向民主的社会变革。这种变革还要取决于其他阶级的立场、体制内权力的平衡状况和不可预知的危机的出现。第三，尽管李普塞特那篇1959年发表的文章所考察的例子都来自20世纪40年代和50年代早期的西方世界、拉丁美洲和欧洲以外的英语国家，但其论断的逻辑一定（也已经被证明）适用于世界的其他地区和中产阶级发展的之后的时段。

在这种语境下，中国中产阶级的情况就似乎成了一个谜题。在有些时候，可以肯定地说中国的中产阶层是呼唤民主的：1989年民主运动蔓延至300多个城市，不仅学生而且所有类型的城市居民都卷入其中；在反对兴建垃圾焚化厂和化工厂的邻僻运动中；在抵制假冒伪劣商品、环境污染事件和2015年8月发生的天津化学品仓库爆炸这样的灾难的抗议中；在维权运动、新公民运动、女权主义者和为了扩展在公民社会中活动空间的其他团体的抗争中。

基于这些例子，很多学者（包括西方的和中国的）预测，随着中产阶级的增长，它会给政府施加更多自由化的压力。[4]西方对中国的“接触”（engagement）政策也部分地基于这个预期。希望这种接触会培育出一个中产阶级，而这个中产阶级会推进民主。

然而，大多数时间，中国中产阶级的行为并不符合这样的预期。在遭遇和当局的冲突时，大多数的中产阶级成员，都尽量避免挑战体制。他们会采取规劝（remonstration）的策略，声明他们对体制规则和政策的忠诚，只批评低层级官员的执行问题。

在众多的调查中，中产阶层的受访者都对中国的威权体制表现出高度的支持。最近，天津市公布，民众对政府、共产党、法院和警察的信任度超过80%。在狄忠蒲（Bruce J. Dickson）近期的调查中，他发现受访者“对中央政府的满意度”平均达到了7.59（尺度为0—10），城市居民和收入有所改善者表现出对中央政府更高的支持度。陈杰的调查和访谈（见他的2013年出版的《没有民主的中产阶级》［A Middle ClassWithout Democracy ］）得出了类似的结论：中国的中产阶级广泛地认同体制，而且比其他社会阶层更不赞同民主制度，说明中产阶级在近期不可能成为民主化的推动者。[5]

所以到底出了什么问题？中国是个“例外”吗？（“例外论”是李普塞特教授另外一个最常谈论的话题，当然他是指美国而非中国）就中国中产阶级不同于其他国家中产阶级的表现来说，是否真的存在“中国模式”呢？事实上，李普塞特这种关注历史和社会学背景的方法对研究中国问题是非常奏效的，因为中国的中产阶级的状况确实在很多重要方面不同于李普塞特研究的那些国家，所以它们的表现也在很多方面有所不同。

## 在中国，哪些人属于中产阶级？

在我们分析中产阶级的状况之前，我们需要先搞清楚我们到底在谈论谁。并不是所有认为自己是中产阶级的人都属于李普塞特所说的中产阶级。比如，2008年的亚洲晴雨表调查（Asian Barometer Survey）在除西藏以外的中国全部人口（包括城市和农村）中抽样，请受访者回答自己在一个从最低到最高的10个社会地位层级种处在哪个位置，结果有 58.2%的受访者将自己定位在中间位置，也就是5到7。如果我们考虑到77.2%的受访者表示他们家庭的经济状况比几年前更好，这种调查结果就可以理解了。比如，当一个工人有能力寄钱回农村帮助家她的家庭盖起一座瓦房而且能购买一辆摩托车的时候，她有理由认为自己已经上升为中产阶级。但我们不会认为她是李普塞特意义上的中产阶级。

用收入来界定中国的中产阶级不是一个好方法。中国人的收入的变化太快，以至于一个收入群体无法稳定成一个可定义的阶级。（而且，很多中国家庭有非常多样的收入来源，以至于他们无法准确的说出他们到底挣了多少钱，有的人即使能也不愿意这么做。）仅仅以收入来界定的话，2005年就有超过8亿中国人可以算作中产阶级，大概是总人口的57%。[6]

但这并不是我们要探究的、根据李普塞特的理论应该支持民主的那个中产阶级。李普赛特在解释中产阶级支持民主的偏好时，是将农村小地主、城市小商人和白领独立专业人士作为他当时研究的中产阶级所处的典型社会地位。他们占有物质财富和一定的技能与尊严，这样他们就有了免于专制政府剥夺的需求，也有了对表达自己诉求的权利的需求。

结果，中国的社会学家在分析中国的社会结构的时候，（可能受到李普塞特理论的影响）也将人们的职业作为社会分层的主要指标。（有趣的是，他们拒绝使用“阶级”［class］这个词，因为它在马克思主义中与剥削和阶级斗争相联系，而剥削和阶级斗争在今天的“和谐社会”中是不可能存在的。所以，他们就使用“阶层”［stratum］这个词来代替李普塞特所说的“阶级”。）

在中国，最广泛使用的社会阶层分类方法是由中国社会科学院已故的社会学家陆学艺及其同事建立的。他们区分了10种职业群体，从高层次的国家和企业领导者（高于中产阶级）到产业工人、农业劳动者和失业者（低于中产阶级）。中间阶层则指的是“主要从事脑力劳动，生活来源主要依靠工资及薪金，具有谋取较高收入、较好工作环境和相当水准的家庭消费与休闲生活能力，在工作中有某种程度的自主权，并且具有良好的公民、公德意识及相应修养”的群体。[7]他们包括在党政机关和企业工作的专业技术人员、白领办事人员和个体工商户。

## 中国的中产阶级究竟有何不同？

中国中产阶级与李普塞特界定的中产阶级的不同之处，主要体现在四个方面。第一，中国的中产阶级占总人口的比重要小得多。陆学艺和他的同事在1999年估算中产阶级占了总人口的14.1%；陆学艺在之后的一次采访中说，到2008年这个数字会增长为22%—23%。[8]其他的学者也给出了相似的数据。虽然李普塞特并没有明确说他研究的中产阶级在总人口中应占多大比重，但他提出了一个“钻石型”的社会结构，其中间部分占的比重是最大的。相反，中国社会学家却在抱怨中国社会是“金字塔型”的：一个较小的中产阶级被极小的上层阶级和庞大的下层阶级挤在中间。中产阶级占据了一个有特权的社会岛（privileged social island）——具体而言就是生活在目前城市中非常普遍的“住宅小区”（gated communities）之中。中产阶级的成员会害怕，在一个多数人统治的社会，他们必须服从于下层阶级的利益。

第二明显的不同在于职业的本质。中国的中产阶级主要由公务员、国企员工和属于国家或由国家控制的大学、医院、媒体等机构的员工组成。年轻一代更喜欢这样的工作是因为它们能支付体面的薪水，更有保障，而且会比多数私营部门提供更多的附加利益。有野心的年轻人努力争取加入中国共产党是因为党员身份在几乎每个领域都是产生影响力和成功的关键。

很遗憾，对于到底有多少中产阶级直接或间接受雇于党和国家，我没有掌握任何确切的数字。一项对三个大城市的调查显示，60%的中产阶级调查对象受雇于国家机关，而这一因素与对民主的支持程度呈现出明显的负相关。[9]大多数的医生为国有医院工作，大多数的作家为官方的作家协会写作。律师和律师事务所表面上是独立的，但实际上被国家监控。唯一拥有较多独立从业者的行业是艺术和建筑，但是其中多数人还要靠国家的委托或订单来挣钱。独立的企业主仅仅占了中产阶级的一小部分，而且他们也要依靠与官方的密切关系来“搞定”他们的生意。简而言之，这是个依附性的（dependent）中产阶级，而不是独立的（independent）。

这一点很值得再深入探讨。社会学家卢奇·托姆巴（Luigi Tomba）认为，中国中产阶级的崛起始自1990年代的住房改革。这一改革严重地偏向政府部门和国有企业的职工。那些政府部门和国有企业在毛时代就拥有大多数房产，然后将这些房产租给了他们的职工。在住房改革中，政府和国有企业职工通过以下三个渠道用很小的代价就成为了房产的拥有者：一是现有的单位住宅私有化；二是单位建造新的住宅，并以补贴过的价格卖给员工；第三是单位为员工购买商品房补贴贷款或购房款。这些以很低的代价拿到房子的职工，通常可以之后在商品房市场以高价将其卖出。结果就是，这些公务部门的职工“在今天成为了所谓的‘有房阶级’（propertied class）”。[10]政府雇员同时还比其他领域的员工享有更好的医疗保险、养老基金和（近年来）更高的工资增长速度。

第三个中国中产阶级的特殊之处在于它的“新”。李普塞特的中产阶级起源于中世纪的欧洲城市，作为一个不寻常的阶级在17世纪出现。它与现代民族国家和民主制度一起成长，而且拥有被广泛认同且具合法地位的身份。相反，严格地说，中国的中产阶级在1979年之前并不存在。共产革命之前存在的一个小规模的中产阶级在1950年代就被彻底消灭了，取而代之的是罗卡（Jean-Louis Rocca）所说的过着朴素生活、受少数党内精英领导的“一支多层级工人的军队”（an army of stratified workers）。[11]

中产阶级在1980年代的“改革开放”时期重新出现，直到1990年代经济起飞后才得到迅速发展。2012年中国的人均国民总收入（购买力平价）达到了1980年的40倍；城市居民从1978年占总人口的20%增长到2012年的52%；高校招生人数从1990年的200万增长到2005年的1700万。[12]这种急速的变化意味着中国目前的大多数中产阶级是这个阶级的第一代成员，他们的生活方式与其父辈有着明显的不同，而且周遭生活的也是与他类似的、有着全新社会身份的人。即使在有两代人的中产阶级家庭，代际之间的文化差异也往往非常明显。

很难想象如此快速的变化会在多大程度上让个人和他们的社会环境迷失方向。这些住在城市小区中的人正处在一个形成生活方式的过程中，这一过程某种程度上是通过有意识地效仿他们所理解的西方消费习惯来实现的。对成熟的中产阶级来说，财富是走向政治参与的刺激因素；而对新的中产阶级来说，政治参与会分散注意力。目前，中国的中产阶级还未形成共同的认知和利益，更不用说对社会财富的稳定信念，而正是这种信念会促使更多的成熟中产阶级有信心去维护自己的权益。

最后一点不同是他们的社团生活（associational life）。西方中产阶级丰富的社交生活是李普塞特所讨论的重要主题之一。在《稳定的工作》中，李普塞特写道：“[加拿大]萨斯喀彻温省（Saskatchewan）是个政治上极其活跃的地区，虽然仅有80万人口，但当地社区组织和政府就提供了至少12.5万个就业岗位。当我了解到这个情况后，我开始对这个[公民社会和民主之间的]关系敏感起来。”[13]他实际上要指出的是，学校和图书馆的董事会、集体管理的谷仓、福利社以及其他托克维尔意义上的“社团”——而非正式的政治组织——才是有效的政治参与的训练场。

中国的中产阶级没有这样的社团生活。政府将那些有可能与自上而下的青年、女性和工人“群众组织”竞争的组织都列为非法。它允许一些职业组织（而非群众组织）去致力于关注环境问题，却极力阻止地方上的环境抗议。政府还打压独立媒体的兴起，并控制互联网。它允许小规模的志愿者组织在公共健康、环境保护、教育改革和赈灾等领域开展工作，但将其严格限制在提供服务，不允许涉及政策主张。[14]

政府通过认可五大宗教并对它们的人员、财产和活动进行控制来寻求对宗教生活的控制。独立的宗教组织只能在地下运行，并尽可能地避免同当局接触。政府偶尔会容忍某些地方性的、旨在反对歧视或维护女性权益的公民社会组织，比如像益仁平和新公民运动（现在已经被镇压了）。2015年，当局围捕了超过两百名维权律师与相关员工，使他们勇敢地利用法律体系来维护各种弱势群体利益的小小努力走向终结。

城市社区没有与（被中共严密控制的）农村选举相类似的选举。被视为“自治”机构的社区和居民委员会都是自上而下进行组织、由政府雇员操控、须承担诸多任务的。这些任务包括向居民传达政府的政策信息、协助进行户籍管理和执行计划生育、开展卫生大扫除和调解纠纷。如托姆巴所说，社区与居民委员会的预设功能之一就是让中产阶级居民觉得自己比下层社会的人群更“文明”、有更高的“素质”，并为作为社会和谐与政治服从的典型而感到自豪。关于这种委员会，芮杰明(Benjamin Read)写道：“它们不仅是安全机关建立的监视网络的重要组成部分，也会帮助国家根据监控信息来采取行动，并时不时地作为政治运动的一部分来介入。”[15]

目前最活跃的中产阶级社团生活平台也许要算代表房屋所有者对抗地产公司和物业公司的业主委员会了。这些微型社团的利益必须限制在居民小区层面的事务，而且它们一般情况下只跟私营的地产公司（而不是跟政府部门）进行谈判，而且地产公司也通常由地方政府管理、受党的监督、要代表国家执行计划生育和宣传工作。虽然可能对一些当地领袖来说，业主委员会可以作为公民组织和行动的学校，但这种与物业公司针对合约遵守情况和生活条件问题的斗争无法升级到对抗现有政治秩序的阶级利益层面。

## 他们在悄悄地想着什么？

虽然与李普塞特意义上的中产阶级不同，中国的中产阶级也真的具有一些他定义的、与支持民主有关的重要特征。中国中产阶级的成员确实拥有一些财产，他们希望政府通过法治来保护其财产；他们有稳定的工作，这就给他们一种过有尊严生活的期待；他们接受了教育，就有了去探索世界和独立思考的工具。他们已经通过消费、电视、电影、互联网、旅游和留学被西方的价值深深影响了。

确切地说，尽管有社交媒体的兴起，中国大多数中产阶级仍然主要从被政府直接或间接控制的媒体获取信息。中央电视台的《新闻联播》会重点强调阿拉伯之春后中东和北非的混乱；也会用伊朗的稳定来对比伊拉克在政府被西方推翻后的糟糕状况；还会着力报道西方经济的危机和缓慢增长。政府的宣传还会拒斥“西方民主”、赞颂据称更真实和文化上更适合中国的“社会主义民主”，但这种宣传还是会让观众对民主的概念产生亲近感。那些有渠道获得外界信息或去国外旅行过的人会更倾向于赞同西方价值观，也更常批评中国的体制。[16]因此，我们有理由去探究：在这个脆弱又有依附性的新阶级可理解的政治谨慎背后，他们究竟在悄悄地想着什么？

2008年的亚洲晴雨表调查的结果给了我们一些线索。我们可以将调查对象中的中产阶级界定为那些至少接受过中等教育、认为他们的家庭收入可以满足其基本需求并且还有一定储蓄的城市居民。照这个标准，有效抽样中的14.2%可被视作中产阶级。[17]这些财务宽裕、受过相对良好教育的城市居民，与非中产的受访者相比更有可能表达对现有政治运作方式的不满（29.7%对18.9%），[18]也更可能支持一系列抽象的、像分权和司法独立这样的自由民主价值（46.2%对24.7%）。[19]

当年轻一代加入中产阶级行列而老的退出时，这种态度就变得更加明显。确实，由于中、高等教育在中国的迅速普及，中产阶级比其余的中国人要更年轻。在亚洲晴雨表调查中，中产阶级调查对象里18至29岁的人占到了29.5%，而在非中产的调查对象中这一比例仅为18.5%。中产阶级的年轻成员比更年长的成员更有可能表达对现有政治运作方式的不满（34%对27.9%），也更赞同自由民主价值（50.4%对44.5%）。[20]

2005年，中共中央党校的政治学者张伟用深度访谈的研究方法写成了一本很有见地的书，在书中他提出警告：中产阶级有疏离倾向。不同于陆学艺和其他顶尖社会学家（根据中产阶级的受教育情况、社会特权和更高的“素质”）认为中产阶级会是有利于社会和谐与稳定力量的观点，张伟发现中国的中产阶级是沉默、冷漠和疏离的：

## 政治疏离是被动的政治冷漠，相对于通常的政治冷漠，政治疏离并不稳定。更直接一点，政治疏离本身就是一种期望张力，是政治期望没有得到释放的隐性状态。封闭的政治秩序可以压抑政治参与的热情，同时也可能为未来政治参与热情积累着力量……一旦政治疏离显性化为政治参与，其对政治秩序的压力可能比通常的政治参与更加剧烈。[21]

这种分析听起来很真实。我见过的中国中产阶级（当然不是有代表性的样本）会觉得在政治上被封锁。他们用不同的方式来对这种情况作为回应。有一些成为异议分子；这些人的确存在，而且他们很英勇。这里的问题是他们的人数为什么这么少。还有一些中产阶级选择了移民。这样的人有很多；但考虑到中国庞大的人口基数，他们还是占很小的比例。大多数的中产阶级可以归类为其他的四种群体。

最大的一个群体可能是在政治上麻木的（the politicallyanesthetized）。我的印象是这种情况在中产阶级的第二代中尤其普遍。因为年轻，他们对1989年没有什么记忆，对文化大革命更是不了解。他们在一个强调事业和消费的环境中长大。他们明白政治是不能碰的东西，大家心照不宣。一种对这个群体的夸张描述可以在中国大受欢迎的电影系列《小时代》中看到，其中漂亮、富有的上海年轻人只能忙于应付他们的衣服和爱情。[22]

第二个群体是接受者（acceptors）。[23]我曾见过这样的年轻学者，他们从来没听说过刘晓波，也对1989年的事情不感兴趣。其中有一些是“政治思想辅导员”，他们在努力地教导他们的学生要忠诚。我从跟他们的交谈中得到的感受是：他们喜欢他们所在的中国，中国的体制就是这样，体制的真相就是他们准备接受的真相。即使中国保持威权体制，他们的生活还是比生活在毛时代的上两代人更自由、更好了。因此，如史天健所说，虽然亚洲晴雨表调查的受访者认为民主是中国很需要而且适合中国的，但他们同时也认为中国的体制已经很民主了（0—10的尺度中有7.22）[24]

第三个群体是改良派（ameliorators）。他们看到了体制的弊端，但也在他们的有生之年看到了进步。他们相信，通过教育、写作或者法律工作，他们可以用自己的方式推动未来的进步。如果一个人相信这种进步能够实现，那它当然值得去为之努力。

最后一个群体，也许可以被叫做疏离者（the alienated）。这样的人可能在年纪更大或受教育程度较高的中产阶级成员中比较普遍。他们对体制没有幻想，但还没有准备好冒着很大的风险投入到反对运动中，也没准备好放弃他们的优势地位和资源去到国外过一种比较没有权势的生活。如果他们能设计出一个完美的世界，情况可能会不一样，但目前，这些人会继续他们现有的生活。

所有这四个群的人在某种意义上说都是现实主义者，我也因此而尊重他们。1989年的民主运动能够发生的部分原因就是当时初生的中产阶级感觉到新的繁荣收到了通货膨胀和贪污腐败的威胁。这就给了一部分中产阶级表达他们对政治制度的担忧的机会。然而今天，通货膨胀得到了控制，腐败在受到威慑和调查，体制对控制权力表现得很坚决。中国的中产阶级知道，现在并不是挑战威权政治体制的好时机。我认为，这些考虑导致了在本文开头描述的那些有点令人困惑的调查结果。

但是，我愿意用另外一个“A”开头的词来描述那些决定生活在他们既有现实中的人的共同特征：他们是焦虑的（anxious）。中国中产阶级缺少的是一种安全感。经济上，除了一小部分人富裕到可以将资产转移到海外，中国中产阶级的财富增长还是要依托于一个不透明的官僚体系的管理能力，而这种能力在并不清晰的未来将经历风险很大的变化。每一次的经济放缓都感觉像是可能来临的灾难的预兆。政治上，中产阶级被夹在中间。上面是执政党，它正在经历着一场以反腐运动为形式的、诡谲而又危险的斗争。下面是大量的工人和农民，他们被认为是不文明的，在强压着不满的怒火。而且在中产阶级看来，他们和下层阶级的利益是互相对立的。

这就是那些陷在不稳定的现实中的人的矛盾心理。这也是现在的体制看起来非常害怕中产阶级的原因，尽管这个阶级表达出对其很高的支持度。习近平的体制已经在试着采取措施震慑中产阶级，既通过新的《国家安全法》和起草关于网络安全和国外公民社会组织的法律，也通过镇压维权律师、增强意识形态统一的要求和创建一种看起来像新极权主义的体制。施加在“和谐社会”之上的压力在之前的胡锦涛时期就在持续加压，而且一些有限的、小规模公民社会活动空间的开放也转变为更高压和威胁性的政策。这些措施看似阻止了中产阶级去挑战政权，但也付出了增加其焦虑感的代价。

## 文化特殊论？

是不是所有这些都意味着中国在文化上是特殊的呢？确实有一些论调说中国的中产阶级之所以在政治上比较顺从是因为中国人对和谐与集体主义价值的偏爱。我同意，不同的文化都是独特的行为模式和价值观的混合（中国和美国的文化都不是铁板一块）。而且，就像史天健已经指出的，在过去的儒家社会中，重视集体利益和等级制度的观念确实相对来说更强一些。[25]

但是，我们在这里应该再一次遵循李普塞特的引导。他在几本书中写到的对美国例外论深入观察都强调：制度根源，而不是文化因素致使美国具有缺少强有力的社会主义运动、种族分裂和右翼极端主义时常复兴的特性。[26]这种论断对中国中产阶级的态度问题也同样成立：这种态度是对今天中国从过去继承的制度现实（一党制、国家控制经济、庞大工人和农民阶级的持续存在）的反应。许多其他后发展国家的经济都遵循了相似的制度路径，而且他们的中产阶级也相似地在他们更为壮大之前呈现不活跃的状态。在这个意义上，中国的中产阶级一点都不特殊。

但中国正在改变。中国的中产阶级将面对怎样的未来呢？虽然李普塞特提醒过说，社会科学家并不擅长预测未来，我们可能还是要冒险做一些猜测。[27]只要中国的经济继续以目前的水平（据称是7%，但更准确的数字可能是5%左右）增长，而且政治制度保持稳定，中产阶级就会进一步扩张。对民主的前景来说，这种剧情发展的意义是绝不是单向的。中国的社会学家希望持续的繁荣能够减少社会冲突，也希望追求稳定的中产阶级会继续支持现有政权。另一方面，如果中产阶级的价值观变得越来越自由化，即使他们会继续忍受一个持续带来繁荣的政权，他们对政治疏离感也会增长。

虽然政权内部的一个派系自上而下地实施民主转型不太可能发生，但如果真的发生了，我们应该可以期待，只要其过程不扰乱社会和平和经济稳定，中产阶级会欢迎这种尝试。一旦这个政权像1989年那样看起来要走向分裂，中产阶级可能会再一次在政治上觉醒并基于其深埋已久的不满而行动起来。[28]但即使照着这样的剧情发展，我们也不能指望中产阶级会成为民主化的决定性力量，除非它以某种方式克服了与其他阶级的文化和社会隔绝，又或者它经历了一定的过程终于成为了中国“钻石型”社会结构中规模最大的阶级。

然而，如果经济增长停滞，或者现政权开始左转（可能性很小）并侵害中产阶级的利益，中产阶级的安宁生活就会受到威胁。城市的生活方式会难以为继，越来越多的大学毕业生会找不到好工作。我们应该提醒自己，李普塞特没有说中产阶级会永远支持民主。李普塞特在另一篇著名的文章《“法西斯主义”——左、中、右》(“‘Fascism’—Left,Right, and Center”)里告诉我们，当中产阶级的经济和社会地位的安全程度降低，他们有可能会支持某种形式的极端主义。[29]在中国，这种极端主义很可能产生自仇外的民族主义，而这种民族主义正是政府一直作为支撑其合法的一种资源来推广的。为了表达这种民族主义的愤怒，中产阶级可能会指责政府叛国或者软弱，而这将推动政权往更为专制的方向发展。

这两种对未来的假设都充满风险，也正是这种想法让中国的中产阶级继续保持今天的状态。中产阶级真正担心的是经济、军事危机，或者触发秩序崩溃的内部权力斗争。对这种危机的担忧也解释了，为什么中产阶级在持续拥抱自由价值的同时，仍然支持一个威权体制。

（黎安友：哥伦比亚大学政治学系教授。陈万龙：中国大陆社会学者。）

[1] Seymour MartinLipset, “SteadyWork: An Academic Memoir,” Annual Review ofSociology 22 (1996): 7.

[2] PoliticalMan: The Social Bases of Politics, expanded and updated ed. (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 31.

[3] 对于这个理论争议及其在中国的适用状况的文献综述，见Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu, “Democratizationand the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class’sAttitudes Toward Democracy,” Political ResearchQuarterly 64 (September 2011): 705–19.

[4] 就此问题的英文学术研究的综述，见Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’sDilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy forSurvival (Oxford University Press, 2016).中文学术研究的综述，见 Cheng Li, “Chinese Scholarship on theMiddle Class: From Social Stratification to Political Potential,” in Li, ed., China’s EmergingMiddle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 55–83.

[5] Tianjian Shi, “China:Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System,”in Yun-han Chu et al., eds., How East Asians View Democracy (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2008), 229; Dickson, appendix toDictator’s Dilemma; Jie Chen, A MiddleClass Without Democracy: Economic Growth and the Prospects for Democratizationin China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[6] 基于一个对中产阶级的定义，即在2005年每人每天消费支出在2到20美元之间（购买力平价）。按照此定义，可以算出在2005年中国有超过8亿人属于中产阶级。这个算法根据Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and thePacific 2010 (August 2010), 5, www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-2010.

[7] 陆学艺（LuXueyi）编，《当代中国社会阶层研究报告》（Research report on socialstrata in contemporary China），北京：社会科学文献出版社，2002：252。

[8] 见《独家专访陆学艺:中产阶级每年增长一个百分点》（“Lu Xueyi Exclusive Interview: Middle Class Grew by OnePercentage Point per Year” ），新华网，2009年8月17日， http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/17/content_11894452.htm 。

[9] Chen and Lu, “Democratizationand the Middle Class in China,” 713–14. 这项研究是在北京、成都和西安进行的。

[10] LuigiTomba, The Government Next Door: Neighborhood Politics in Urban China (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2014), 104.

[11] Jean-LouisRocca, A Sociology of Modern China, trans. Gregory Elliott (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2015), 16.

[12] 关于收入，见: http://knoema.com/pjeqzh/gdp-per-capita-by-country-1980-2014?country=China;关于城市化，见: World Bank and the Development Research Center of the StateCouncil, People’s Republic of China, UrbanChina: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization (Washington,D.C.: World Bank, 2014), 3; 关于高校招生，见: Jing Lin andXiaoyan Sun, “Higher Education Expansion and China’s Middle Class,” in Li, ed.,China’s Emerging Middle Class, 222.

[13] Lipset, “SteadyWork,” 9.

[14] Jessica C.Teets, Civil Society Under Authoritarianism: The China Model (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[15] Benjamin L.Read, Roots of the State: Neighborhood Organization and Social Networksin Beijing and Taipei (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012),107.

[16] Haifeng Huang, “InternationalKnowledge and Domestic Evaluations in a Changing Society: The Case of China,” American Political Science Review 109 (August 2015): 613–34.

[17] 用这种方法界定的中产阶级比之前在这篇文章中引用的社会学家们界定的超过20%的比例要小。没有直接的方法去比较这两个群体，但考虑到亚洲晴雨表调查定义的中产阶级比将其界定为更大群体的那个中产阶级更城市化、更富裕，我们使用这个数据应该是比较恰当的。

[18] 亚洲晴雨表调查提出的问题是：“你对民主在你们国家运作的情况有多满意？”问题是为跨国家的调查设计的，而且因为所有的亚洲政府都声称它们是民主国家，我们也可以相信这种大体上对政治制度的满意度评分。要比较的话，参见Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman, “Satisfactionwith Democracy: A Note on a Frequently Used Indicator in Comparative Politics,” European Journal of Political Research 42 (May2003): 391–408.

[19] 这些是在亚洲晴雨表调查列出的7项“自由民主价值”中至少支持4项的人所占的比例。基于世界价值观调查（World Values Survey）和对亚洲与非亚洲国家的比较得出的，关于更现代化的人口持有更自由的价值观这一模式的普适性的调查结果，见Christian Welzel, “The Asian Values ThesisRevisited: Evidence from the World Values Surveys,”JapaneseJournal of Political Science 12 (April 2011):1–31.

[20] 关于对亚洲和中国青年人态度的类似调查结果，见Yun-han Chu and Bridget Welsh, “Millennialsand East Asia’s Democratic Future,” Journal of Democracy 26 (April 2015): 151–64, and Min-hua Huang, Yun-han Chu, and Cao Yongrong, “China: The Impact of Modernization and Liberalization on DemocraticAttitudes,” in David Denemark, Robert Mattes, andRichard G. Niemi, eds., Growing Up Democratic: Generational Change inPost-Authoritarian Societies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,forthcoming).

[21]张伟（ZhangWei），《冲突与变数：中国社会中产阶层政治分析》（Conflict and uncertainty:political analysis of the middle stratum in Chinese society），北京：社会科学文献出版社，2005：406—407。

[22] 见 www.youtube.com/watch?v=q61X3zfBE8g.

[23] 这种分析可以参照：Eva Bellin, “The Dog That Didn’t Bark:The Political Complacence of the Emerging Middle Class (withIllustrations from the Middle East),” in Julian Go,ed., Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 21 (Bingley, U.K.:Emerald, 2010), 125–41; Kellee S. Tsai, “Capitalists Without a Class: Political Diversity Among PrivateEntrepreneurs in China,” Comparative PoliticalStudies 38 (November 2005): 1130–58; TeresaWright, Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China’s Reform Era (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2010).

[24] TianjianShi, The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 195. 这些数据来自2003年亚洲晴雨表调查的中国调查。

[25] Shi, CulturalLogic. 然而，史天健会同意李普塞特的观点：文化个和价值会被社会结构和制度逐渐地塑造。

[26] Seymour MartinLipset with Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremismin America, 1790–1977 (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1970); Lipset, American Exceptionalism: ADouble-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), Lipset with GaryMarks, It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed inthe United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

[27] Seymour MartinLipset, “Predictingthe Future: The Limits of Social Science,” in Consensusand Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology (New Brunswick, N.J.:Transaction, 1985), 329–60, orig. in Lipset, ed., TheThird Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society (Stanford: HooverInstitution Press, 1979), 1–35.

[28] Andrew J.Nathan, “Foreseeingthe Unforeseeable,” Journal of Democracy 24 (January 2013): 20–25.

[29] InLipset, Political Man, ch. 5.

注：本文来自于《中国战略分析》网站，特此感谢。

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# Andrew J. Nathan: The Puzzle of China’s Middle Class (2015)

My spiritual home S 2018-05-16

Author Li Anyou

January 16, 2017 (Chinese version publication date)

Chinese middle class puzzle

Written by Li Anyou

Translated by Chen Wanlong

This article is the transcript of a lecture delivered by Columbia University professor Andrew J. Nathan at the "Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on Democracy in the World" in October 2015. Lipset is the main founder of modernization theory. He discusses the occurrence and existence conditions of democracy from the perspective of socio-economic structure. The English version of Professor Li Anyou's speech was published in the April 2016 issue of Journal of Democracy, issue 27 overall. The Chinese translation was first published in "China Strategic Analysis" 2017 Issue 1, January 15, 2017.


> I personally never met Seymour Martin Lipset; he had already left by the time I arrived at Columbia. Lipset wrote an autobiographical article, "A Steady Job: An Academic Memoir," in which he reviewed his experience in becoming a PhD student at Columbia University in 1943. I found it very interesting. He said that he got a teaching position in the sociology department of City College of New York at the time, and that teaching position required that the candidate be a registered graduate student. Because Columbia University was only a mile away, just downhill and uphill, he went to Columbia University. [1] I thought to myself, if only choosing a graduate program were that simple today.


As a doctoral student and young lecturer at Columbia University, Lipset worked with academic giants such as Robert Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld, who laid the foundation for modern political sociology. . By the time I entered graduate school in the mid-1960s, Lipset's work had become required reading for our Ph.D. Now, as a senior scholar, I complain that students don't read the classics in the subject. But Lipset's "Political Man" published in 1960 is an exception, and everyone will read it. Particularly influential was his 1959 article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", which is included as a chapter in this book , entitled "Economic Development and Democracy". This article discusses one of his classic propositions: "The more developed a country's economy is, the more likely it is to sustain its democratic system." [2] Lipset (under the influence of Aristotle, Machiavelli and Weber) proposed that economic development will expand the middle class, and the middle class will support democracy.

There has been much debate about how exactly this theory should be understood,[3] but there is no consensus in this area. Regarding this issue, I insist that: first, the middle class will be more inclined to choose democracy. They will support democracy if it already exists; they will want it (though not necessarily act on it) if it does not exist yet. This tendency to support democracy is based both on material interests (for example, the middle class hopes to have the rule of law to protect their property ownership) and on cultural values ​​(for example, independent economic status and educational opportunities will bring independent individuals self-esteem and preference for freedom of thought and expression). Second, however, the existence of a middle class does not necessarily lead to social change toward democracy. Such changes also depend on the positions of other classes, the balance of power within the system, and the emergence of unpredictable crises. Third, although the examples examined in Lipset's 1959 article all come from the Western world, Latin America, and English-speaking countries outside Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s, the logic of his assertions is certain (also has been shown) to apply to other parts of the world and later periods of middle-class development.

In this context, the situation of China's middle class seems to have become a puzzle. At some times, it can be safely said that China's middle class is calling for democracy: in 1989, the democratic movement spread to more than 300 cities, involving not only students but all types of urban residents; in opposition to the construction of garbage incineration plants and chemical plants in the neighborhood movement; in the protests against counterfeit and substandard goods, environmental pollution incidents, and disasters such as the Tianjin chemical warehouse explosion in August 2015; in the rights protection movement, the new citizens’ movement, feminists, and the expansion of civil rights in the struggles of other groups within society’s movement space.

Based on these examples, many scholars (both Western and Chinese) predict that as the middle class grows, it will put more pressure on governments to liberalize. [4] The West’s “engagement” policy toward China is partly based on this expectation. The hope is that this engagement will create a middle class that will advance democracy.

However, most of the time, China's middle class does not behave in line with such expectations. When encountering conflicts with the authorities, most members of the middle class try to avoid challenging the system. They will adopt a strategy of remonstration, stating their loyalty to institutional rules and policies, and only criticize low-level officials for implementation issues.

In numerous surveys, middle-class respondents have shown high support for China’s authoritarian system. Recently, Tianjin announced that people’s trust in the government, the Communist Party, the courts and the police exceeded 80%. In a recent survey by Bruce J. Dickson, he found that respondents’ “satisfaction with the central government” averaged 7.59 (on a scale of 0-10), with urban residents and those whose incomes have improved showing Higher support for the central government. Chen Jie’s surveys and interviews (see his 2013 book A Middle Class Without Democracy) have reached similar conclusions: China’s middle class broadly identifies with the system and more so than other social classes. Disapproval of the democratic system shows that the middle class is unlikely to be a promoter of democratization in the near future. [5]

So what went wrong? Is China an "exception"? (“Exceptionalism” is another of Professor Lipset’s most frequently discussed topics. Of course, he is referring to the United States, not China.) In terms of the performance of the Chinese middle class that is different from that of the middle class in other countries, is there really a “China model?” "Woolen cloth? In fact, Lipset's method of focusing on the historical and sociological background is very effective in studying China, because the situation of China's middle class is indeed different from the countries Lipset studied in many important aspects, so Their performance also differs in many ways.

## Who belongs to the middle class in China?

Before we analyze the situation of the middle class, we need to understand who we are talking about. Not everyone who considers themselves middle class is what Lipset calls middle class. For example, the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey sampled the entire Chinese population (including urban and rural areas) except Tibet, and asked respondents to answer questions about where they fit into 10 social status levels from the lowest to the highest. In terms of position, 58.2% of the respondents positioned themselves in the middle position, that is, 5 to 7. This finding is understandable if we consider that 77.2% of respondents said that their family's financial situation is better than it was a few years ago. For example, when a worker is able to send money back to the countryside to help her family build a tile-roofed house and buy a motorcycle, she has reason to think that she has risen to the middle class. But we would not think of her as middle-class in Lipset's sense.

Defining China's middle class by income is not a good way. The incomes of Chinese people are changing too fast for one income group to stabilize into a definable class. (Moreover, many Chinese families have such diverse sources of income that they cannot accurately tell how much money they earn, and some are unwilling to do so even if they could.) Defined solely by income, in 2005 There are more than 800 million Chinese people who can be counted as middle class, which is about 57% of the total population. [6]

But this is not the middle class we want to explore and who, according to Lipset's theory, should support democracy. When Lipset explained the pro-democracy preferences of the middle class, he considered rural small landowners, urban small businessmen, and white-collar independent professionals as the typical social positions of the middle class he studied at the time. They possess material wealth and certain skills and dignity, so that they have the need to be free from deprivation by authoritarian governments and the right to express their demands.

As a result, Chinese sociologists (possibly influenced by Lipset's theory) also use people's occupations as the main indicator of social stratification when analyzing China's social structure. (Interestingly, they reject the word "class" because it is associated in Marxism with exploitation and class struggle, which cannot exist in today's "harmonious society." So they used the word "stratum" instead of Lipset's "class.")

In China, the most widely used method of classifying social class was established by the late sociologist Lu Xueyi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and his colleagues. They distinguished 10 occupational groups, ranging from high-level state and business leaders (above the middle class) to industrial workers, agricultural laborers and the unemployed (below the middle class). The middle class refers to "people who are mainly engaged in mental work, whose source of livelihood mainly depends on wages and salaries, who have the ability to earn higher income, better working environment and a considerable level of family consumption and leisure life, and have a certain degree of autonomy at work. rights, and have good citizenship, public moral awareness and corresponding cultivation". [7] They include professional and technical personnel, white-collar workers and individual industrial and commercial households working in party and government agencies and enterprises.

## What is the difference between China’s middle class?

The differences between the Chinese middle class and the middle class defined by Lipset are mainly reflected in four aspects. First, China's middle class accounts for a much smaller proportion of the total population. Lu Xueyi and his colleagues estimated in 1999 that the middle class accounted for 14.1% of the total population; Lu Xueyi said in a subsequent interview that this number would grow to 22%-23% by 2008. [8] Other scholars also gave similar data. Although Lipset did not explicitly say what proportion of the total population the middle class he studied should account for, he proposed a "diamond-shaped" social structure in which the middle segment accounted for the largest proportion. Instead, Chinese sociologists complain that Chinese society is "pyramid-shaped": a smaller middle class squeezed in by a tiny upper class and a huge lower class. The middle class occupies a privileged social island—specifically, living in the “gated communities” that are so common in cities today. Members of the middle class may fear that in a majority-dominated society they must subordinate themselves to the interests of the lower classes.

The second obvious difference lies in the nature of the profession. China's middle class mainly consists of civil servants, employees of state-owned enterprises and employees of universities, hospitals, media and other institutions belonging to or controlled by the state. Younger generations prefer such jobs because they pay decent wages, are more secure, and offer more fringe benefits than most in the private sector. Ambitious young people strive to join the Chinese Communist Party because party membership is the key to influence and success in almost every field.

Unfortunately, I do not have any precise figures on how many middle-class people are directly or indirectly employed by the party and the state. A survey in three major cities showed that 60% of middle-class respondents were employed by state agencies, and this factor showed a clear negative correlation with support for democracy. [9] Most doctors work for state-owned hospitals, and most writers write for official writers' associations. Lawyers and law firms appear to be independent, but are actually monitored by the state. The only industries with a large number of independent practitioners are art and architecture, but most of them also rely on commissions or orders from the state to make money. Independent business owners make up only a small part of the middle class, and they also rely on close ties with the government to “get” their business done. In short, this is a dependent middle class, not an independent one.

This is worth exploring further. Sociologist Luigi Tomba believes that the rise of China's middle class began with the housing reform in the 1990s. This reform heavily favored employees in government departments and state-owned enterprises. Those government agencies and state-owned enterprises owned most of the properties during the Mao era and then rented them to their employees. In the housing reform, government and state-owned enterprise employees became property owners at a small cost through the following three channels: first, the privatization of existing unit housing; second, the unit built new housing and subsidized it. The property is sold to employees at a reasonable price; the third is that the unit subsidizes loans or purchase money for employees to purchase commercial housing. These employees who get the house at a very low price can usually sell it at a high price in the commercial housing market. As a result, these public sector workers “have become what is called the ‘properted class’ today.” [10] Government employees also enjoy better health insurance, pension funds, and (in recent years) higher wage growth rates than employees in other fields.

The third special feature of China's middle class lies in its "newness". The Lipset middle class originated in medieval European cities and emerged as an unusual class in the 17th century. It has grown up alongside modern nation-states and democratic institutions and has a widely recognized and legitimate identity. On the contrary, strictly speaking, China's middle class did not exist before 1979. A small middle class that existed before the communist revolution was completely wiped out in the 1950s, replaced by what Jean-Louis Rocca calls "a large group of people who lived a simple life and were led by a small number of party elites". an army of stratified workers. [11]

The middle class re-emerged during the "reform and opening up" period in the 1980s, and did not develop rapidly until the economic takeoff in the 1990s. In 2012, China's per capita gross national income (purchasing power parity) reached 40 times that of 1980; urban residents accounted for 52% of the total population from 20% in 1978; and the number of college enrollment increased from 2 million in 1990 to 17 million in 2005. [12] This rapid change means that most of China’s current middle class are the first generation members of this class. Their lifestyles are obviously different from their parents’ generation, and they are also surrounded by people similar to them, with a completely new society. identity person. Even in middle-class families with two generations, cultural differences between the generations are often stark.

It is difficult to imagine the extent to which such rapid change can disorient individuals and their social environments. These people who live in urban communities are in the process of forming a lifestyle, in part by consciously emulating what they understand to be Western consumption habits. For the mature middle class, wealth is a stimulus toward political participation; for the new middle class, political participation is a distraction. At present, China's middle class has not yet formed a common understanding and interests, let alone a stable belief in social wealth, and it is this belief that will give more mature middle classes the confidence to safeguard their rights and interests.

The final difference is their associational life. The rich social life of the Western middle class is one of the important themes Lipset discusses. In "Steady Jobs," Lipset writes: "Saskatchewan [Canada] is an extremely politically active region with a population of only 800,000, but local community organizations and government provide created at least 125,000 jobs. When I learned about this situation, I became sensitive to the relationship [between civil society and democracy].” [13] What he actually wanted to point out is that the relationship between schools and libraries Boards of directors, collective barns, welfare societies, and other "societies" in Tocqueville's sense—rather than formal political organizations—were the training grounds for effective political participation.

China's middle class does not have such corporate life. The government outlawed any organization that might compete with top-down “mass organizations” of youth, women, and workers. It allows some professional organizations (rather than mass organizations) to focus on environmental issues, but it strongly discourages local environmental protests. The government also suppresses the rise of independent media and controls the Internet. It allows small-scale volunteer organizations to work in areas such as public health, environmental protection, education reform, and disaster relief, but strictly limits them to the provision of services and does not allow for policy advocacy. [14]

The government seeks control over religious life by recognizing the five major religions and exercising control over their personnel, property, and activities. Independent religious organizations can only operate underground and avoid contact with the authorities as much as possible. The government occasionally tolerated local civil society organizations that aimed to fight discrimination or defend women's rights, such as Yi Renping and the New Citizens Movement (now suppressed). In 2015, the authorities rounded up more than two hundred human rights lawyers and related employees, bringing an end to their small efforts to bravely use the legal system to safeguard the interests of various vulnerable groups.

Urban communities have no equivalent of elections in rural areas (which are tightly controlled by the CCP). Community and residents' committees, considered "autonomous" institutions, are organized from the top down, controlled by government employees, and have many tasks to undertake. These tasks include conveying government policy information to residents, assisting with household registration management and family planning, carrying out health cleaning and mediating disputes. As Tomba said, one of the preset functions of community and resident committees is to make middle-class residents feel that they are more "civilized" and have higher "quality" than the lower-class people, and to contribute to social harmony and political obedience. Proud to be a typical example. Of such committees, Benjamin Read writes: “Not only are they an important part of the surveillance networks established by security agencies, they also help the state act on surveillance information and, from time to time, intervene as part of political campaigns. "[15]

Perhaps the most active middle-class social life platform at present is the homeowners committee that represents homeowners against real estate companies and property management companies. The interests of these micro-associations must be limited to matters at the residential community level, and they generally only negotiate with private real estate companies (rather than with government departments), and real estate companies are usually managed by local governments and subject to party supervision. To represent the country in carrying out family planning and publicity work. While it may be that for some local leaders, owners' committees can serve as a school for citizen organization and action, such struggles with property companies over issues of contract compliance and living conditions cannot be escalated to the level of class interests that confront the existing political order.

## What are they thinking quietly?

Although different from the middle class in Lipset's sense, China's middle class does have some important characteristics related to support for democracy that he defines. Members of China's middle class do own some property, and they hope that the government will protect their property through the rule of law; they have stable jobs, which gives them an expectation of living a dignified life; and when they receive education, they have the opportunity to explore the world. and tools for independent thinking. They have been deeply influenced by Western values through consumption, television, movies, the Internet, travel and studying abroad.

To be sure, despite the rise of social media, most of China’s middle class still get their information primarily from media that is directly or indirectly controlled by the government. CCTV's "News Network" will focus on the chaos in the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring; it will also use the stability of Iran to compare the dire situation in Iraq after the government was overthrown by the West; and it will also focus on reporting on the crisis and slow growth of the Western economy. . Government propaganda also rejects "Western democracy" and celebrates "socialist democracy" that is said to be more authentic and culturally appropriate for China, but it still creates an affinity for the concept of democracy among viewers. Those who have access to outside information or have traveled abroad are more likely to agree with Western values and are more likely to criticize China's system. [16] Therefore, we have reason to explore: Behind the understandable political caution of this fragile and dependent new class, what are they secretly thinking?

The results of the 2008 Asian Barometer survey give us some clues. We can define the middle class among the survey respondents as those urban residents who have received at least a secondary education, believe that their family income can meet their basic needs, and have some savings. According to this standard, 14.2% of the effective sample can be regarded as middle class. [17] These financially well-off and relatively well-educated urban residents are more likely than non-middle-class respondents to express dissatisfaction with the current way politics is run (29.7% vs. 18.9%). [18] They are also more likely to Support a range of abstract liberal democratic values such as separation of powers and judicial independence (46.2% vs. 24.7%). [19]

This attitude becomes even more pronounced as younger generations join the ranks of the middle class and older ones drop out. Indeed, due to the rapid spread of secondary and higher education in China, the middle class is younger than the rest of the Chinese population. In the Asia Barometer survey, 29.5% of middle-class respondents were aged 18 to 29, while this proportion was only 18.5% of non-middle-class respondents. Younger members of the middle class are more likely than older members to express dissatisfaction with the way politics is run (34% vs. 27.9%) and more likely to endorse liberal democratic values (50.4% vs. 44.5%). [20]

In 2005, Zhang Wei, a political scientist at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, wrote a very insightful book using in-depth interview research methods. In the book, he warned that the middle class has a tendency to alienate. Unlike Lu Xueyi and other leading sociologists who believed that the middle class would be a force for social harmony and stability (based on their education, social privileges, and higher "quality"), Zhang Wei found that China's middle class Is silent, indifferent and alienated:

## Political alienation is passive political indifference. Compared with ordinary political indifference, political alienation is not stable. More directly, political alienation itself is a tension of expectations, a hidden state in which political expectations have not been released. A closed political order can suppress enthusiasm for political participation, and at the same time, it may also accumulate strength for future enthusiasm for political participation... Once political alienation becomes explicit into political participation, the pressure on the political order may be more intense than usual political participation. [twenty one]

This analysis rings true. The Chinese middle class I have met (certainly not a representative sample) would feel politically blocked. They responded to this situation in different ways. Some became dissidents; these people existed, and they were heroic. The question here is why their numbers are so small. There are also some middle-class people who choose to immigrate. There are many such people; but considering China's huge population base, they still account for a very small proportion. Most of the middle class can be classified into the other four groups.

Perhaps the largest group is the politically anesthetized. My impression is that this is especially prevalent among the second generation of the middle class. Because they are young, they have little memory of 1989 and even less understanding of the Cultural Revolution. They grew up in an environment that emphasized career and consumption. They understand that politics is something that cannot be touched, and everyone understands this tacitly. An exaggerated depiction of this group can be seen in the popular Chinese film series "Tiny Times," in which beautiful, wealthy young Shanghainese are left to juggle their clothes and their love interests. [twenty two]

The second group is the acceptors. [23] I have met young scholars who have never heard of Liu Xiaobo and are not interested in what happened in 1989. Some of them are "political counselors" who work hard to teach their students to be loyal. The feeling I got from talking to them is that they like the China where they live, the Chinese system is like this, and the truth of the system is the truth they are ready to accept. Even if China maintains its authoritarian system, their lives are freer and better than those of the previous two generations who lived under Mao. Therefore, as Shi Tianjian said, although respondents to the Asia Barometer survey believe that democracy is very needed and suitable for China, they also believe that China’s system is already very democratic (7.22 on a scale of 0-10) [ twenty four]

The third group is the ameliorators. They have seen the shortcomings of the system, but they have also seen progress within their lifetimes. They believe that through education, writing, or legal work, they can advance the future in their own way. If one believes that such progress can be achieved, it is certainly worth striving for.

The last group might be called the alienated. Such people may be more common among older or more educated members of the middle class. They have no illusions about the system, but they are not yet ready to take the big risks involved in an opposition movement, nor are they ready to give up their advantageous positions and resources to live a less powerful life abroad. If they could design a perfect world, things might be different, but for now, these people will continue with their current lives.

All four groups are realists in some sense, and I respect them for that. The pro-democracy movement of 1989 took place in part because the nascent middle class felt that its new prosperity was threatened by inflation and corruption. This gave a section of the middle class an opportunity to express their concerns about the political system. Today, however, inflation is under control, corruption is deterred and investigated, and the system is determined to rein in power. China's middle class knows that now is not a good time to challenge the authoritarian political system. These considerations, I think, lead to the somewhat puzzling findings described at the beginning of this article.

However, I would like to use another "A" word to describe a common characteristic of people who decide to live in their given reality: they are anxious. What China's middle class lacks is a sense of security. Economically, except for a small group of people who are rich enough to transfer assets overseas, the wealth growth of China's middle class still relies on the management capabilities of an opaque bureaucratic system, and this ability will experience great risks in the unclear future. big change. Every slowdown feels like a harbinger of impending disaster. Politically, the middle class is caught in the middle. Above is the ruling party, which is undergoing a treacherous and dangerous struggle in the form of an anti-corruption campaign. Below are a large number of workers and farmers who are considered uncivilized and suppressing the anger of dissatisfaction. Moreover, from the perspective of the middle class, their interests and those of the lower class are opposed to each other.

Such is the ambivalence of those trapped in an unstable reality. This is why the current system seems so afraid of the middle class, even though this class expresses high levels of support for it. Xi Jinping’s regime is already trying to intimidate the middle class, both through a new national security law and the drafting of laws on cybersecurity and foreign civil society organizations, as well as through a crackdown on rights lawyers, increased demands for ideological unity and the creation of a A system that looks like a new totalitarianism. The pressure on a “harmonious society” had continued to increase during the previous Hu Jintao period, and the opening of some limited and small-scale civil society activities has also transformed into more repressive and threatening policies. These measures seemed to prevent the middle class from challenging the regime, but they also paid the price of increasing their anxiety.

## Cultural particularism?

Does all this mean that China is culturally special? Indeed, there are some arguments that the reason why China's middle class is more politically compliant is because of the Chinese people's preference for harmony and collectivist values. I agree that different cultures are unique blends of behavioral patterns and values (neither Chinese nor American culture is monolithic). Moreover, as Shi Tianjian has pointed out, in the past Confucian society, the concept of focusing on collective interests and hierarchy was indeed relatively stronger. [25]

But here again we should follow Lipset's lead. His in-depth observations on American exceptionalism, written in several books, emphasize that institutional rather than cultural factors characterize the United States' lack of a strong socialist movement, racial divisions, and the recurring resurgence of right-wing extremism. [26] This statement is also true for the attitude of China's middle class: this attitude is a reaction to the institutional realities that today's China has inherited from the past (one-party system, state-controlled economy, and the persistence of a large class of workers and farmers) . The economies of many other late-developing countries followed similar institutional paths, and their middle classes similarly remained inactive until they became stronger. In this sense, China's middle class is not special at all.

But China is changing. What kind of future will China's middle class face? Although Lipset cautions that social scientists are not good at predicting the future, we may still want to hazard some guesses. [27] As long as China’s economy continues to grow at its current level (reportedly 7%, but a more accurate figure may be around 5%) and the political system remains stable, the middle class will expand further. The implications of this plot development for the prospects of democracy are anything but one-sided. Chinese sociologists hope that continued prosperity will reduce social conflict and that a stable middle class will continue to support the current regime. On the other hand, if the values of the middle class become increasingly liberal, their political alienation will grow even as they continue to endure a regime that continues to deliver prosperity.

While a top-down democratic transition by a faction within the regime is unlikely to occur, if it did occur we should expect the middle class to welcome the attempt as long as the process does not disrupt social peace and economic stability. Once the regime looks headed for disintegration, as it did in 1989, the middle class may once again awaken politically and act on its long-buried grievances. [28] But even if this scenario develops, we cannot expect that the middle class will become the decisive force in democratization unless it somehow overcomes its cultural and social isolation from other classes, or it experiences certain The process finally became the largest class in China's "diamond-shaped" social structure.

However, if economic growth stagnates, or if the current regime begins to turn left (which is highly unlikely) and infringes on the interests of the middle class, the peaceful life of the middle class will be threatened. The urban lifestyle will be unsustainable, and more and more college graduates will be unable to find good jobs. We should remind ourselves that Lipset did not say that the middle class would always support democracy. In another famous article, "'Fascism'—Left, Right, and Center" ("'Fascism'—Left, Right, and Center"), Lipset tells us that when the economic and social status of the middle class less secure, they may support some form of extremism. [29] In China, this kind of extremism is likely to arise from xenophobic nationalism, which the government has been promoting as a resource to support its legitimacy. To express this nationalist anger, the middle class may accuse the government of treason or weakness, which could push the regime in a more authoritarian direction.

Both assumptions about the future are fraught with risks, and it's this thinking that keeps China's middle class where it is today. What the middle class really worries about is an economic or military crisis, or an internal power struggle that triggers a breakdown in order. Concern about this crisis also explains why the middle class continues to embrace liberal values while still supporting an authoritarian system.

(Li Anyou: Professor of the Department of Political Science, Columbia University. Chen Wanlong: Mainland Chinese sociologist.)

[1] Seymour MartinLipset, “SteadyWork: An Academic Memoir,” Annual Review ofSociology 22 (1996): 7.

[2] PoliticalMan: The Social Bases of Politics, expanded and updated ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 31.

[3] For a literature review of this theoretical controversy and its application in China, see Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu, "Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class'sAttitudes Toward Democracy," Political ResearchQuarterly 64 (September 2011): 705–19.

[4] For a review of English academic research on this issue, see Bruce Dickson, The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival (Oxford University Press, 2016). For a review of Chinese academic research, see Cheng Li, “Chinese Scholarship on the Middle Class: From Social Stratification to Political Potential,” in Li, ed., China’s EmergingMiddle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 55–83.

[5] Tianjian Shi, "China:Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System," in Yun-han Chu et al., eds., How East Asians View Democracy (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2008), 229; Dickson, appendix toDictator's Dilemma; Jie Chen, A MiddleClass Without Democracy: Economic Growth and the Prospects for Democratization in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[6] Based on a definition of the middle class, consumption expenditure per person per day in 2005 was between US$2 and US$20 (purchasing power parity). According to this definition, it can be calculated that in 2005, more than 800 million people in China belonged to the middle class. This algorithm is based on Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and thePacific 2010 (August 2010), 5, www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-2010.

[7] LuXueyi (ed.), "Research report on socialstrata in contemporary China" (Research report on socialstrata in contemporary China), Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2002: 252.

[8] See "Lu Xueyi Exclusive Interview: Middle Class Grew by OnePercentage Point per Year", Xinhuanet, August 17, 2009, http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/17/content_11894452.htm.

[9] Chen and Lu, “Democratization and the Middle Class in China,” 713–14. This study was conducted in Beijing, Chengdu, and Xi’an.

[10] LuigiTomba, The Government Next Door: Neighborhood Politics in Urban China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 104.

[11] Jean-Louis Rocca, A Sociology of Modern China, trans. Gregory Elliott (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2015), 16.

[12] On income, see: http://knoema.com/pjeqzh/gdp-per-capita-by-country-1980-2014?country=China; on urbanization, see: World Bank and the Development Research Center of the StateCouncil, People's Republic of China, UrbanChina: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014), 3; on college admissions, see: Jing Lin andXiaoyan Sun, “Higher Education Expansion and China’s Middle Class ,” in Li, ed., China’s Emerging Middle Class, 222.

[13] Lipset, “SteadyWork,” 9.

[14] Jessica C.Teets, Civil Society Under Authoritarianism: The China Model (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[15] Benjamin L. Read, Roots of the State: Neighborhood Organization and Social Networks in Beijing and Taipei (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 107.

[16] Haifeng Huang, “International Knowledge and Domestic Evaluations in a Changing Society: The Case of China,” American Political Science Review 109 (August 2015): 613–34.

[17] The middle class defined in this way is smaller than the more than 20% defined by the sociologists quoted in this article. There is no direct way to compare the two groups, but given that the middle class as defined by the Asia Barometer Survey is more urban and wealthier than the middle class that defines it as a larger group, it would be appropriate to use this data .

[18] The Asia Barometer survey asked: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?” The question was designed for cross-country surveys, and because all Asian governments claim they are democracies, We can also trust this overall satisfaction rating with the political system. For a comparison, see Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman, “Satisfaction with Democracy: A Note on a Frequently Used Indicator in Comparative Politics,” European Journal of Political Research 42 (May2003): 391–408.

[19] These are the proportions of people who support at least four of the seven “liberal democratic values” listed in the Asia Barometer survey. For findings on the generalizability of the pattern that more modern populations hold more liberal values, based on the World Values Survey and comparisons of Asian and non-Asian countries, see Christian Welzel, “The Asian Values ThesisRevisited: Evidence from the World Values Surveys,” JapaneseJournal of Political Science 12 (April 2011):1–31.

[20] For similar findings on attitudes toward young people in Asia and China, see Yun-han Chu and Bridget Welsh, "Millennials and East Asia's Democratic Future," Journal of Democracy 26 (April 2015): 151–64, and Min-hua Huang, Yun-han Chu, and Cao Yongrong, “China: The Impact of Modernization and Liberalization on Democratic Attitudes,” in David Denemark, Robert Mattes, andRichard G. Niemi, eds., Growing Up Democratic: Generational Change in Post-Authoritarian Societies ( Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

[21] Zhang Wei, "Conflict and uncertainty: political analysis of the middle stratum in Chinese society", Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005: 406-407 .

[22] See www.youtube.com/watch?v=q61X3zfBE8g.

[23] For this analysis, please refer to: Eva Bellin, "The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Political Complacence of the Emerging Middle Class (with Illustrations from the Middle East)," in Julian Go, ed., Political Power and Social Theory , vol. 21 (Bingley, U.K.:Emerald, 2010), 125–41; Kellee S. Tsai, “Capitalists Without a Class: Political Diversity Among Private Entrepreneurs in China,” ComparativeStudies 38 (November 2005): 1130–58; Teresa Wright , Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China's Reform Era (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2010).

[24] TianjianShi, The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 195. These data come from the 2003 Asia Barometer Survey on China.

[25] Shi, CulturalLogic. However, Shi Tianjian would agree with Lipset: cultural personalities and values will be gradually shaped by social structures and institutions.

[26] Seymour Martin Lipset with Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1977 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Lipset, American Exceptionalism: ADouble-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996 ), Lipset with GaryMarks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

[27] Seymour Martin Lipset, “Predicting the Future: The Limits of Social Science,” in Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1985), 329–60, orig. in Lipset, ed., TheThird Century : America as a Post-Industrial Society (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 1–35.

[28] Andrew J.Nathan, “Foreseeing the Unforeseeable,” Journal of Democracy 24 (January 2013): 20–25.

[29] InLipset, Political Man, ch. 5.

Note: This article comes from the "China Strategic Analysis" website, for which I would like to express my gratitude.

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